Long-Short Memory Steering to Mitigate Unfaithful Self-Brainwashing

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Abstract

Although recent large reasoning models (LRMs) achieve strong performance, their reasoning processes remain vulnerable to external manipulation. We observe that LRMs can gradually rationalize incorrect user-provided hints during multi-step reasoning. Instead of rejecting false hints, models adapt their intermediate states to accommodate them and eventually produce seemingly coherent yet incorrect conclusions. We refer to this phenomenon as self-brainwashing and analyze it through empirical and theoretical analyses. We find that unfaithful reasoning steps are often locally detectable when models only focus on local reasoning context. However, this ability degrades over long reasoning trajectories, allowing unfaithful steps to accumulate and bias the final answer toward the hint. Motivated by these findings, we propose Long-Short Memory Steering (LSMS), a training-free inference-time framework that uses short-term reasoning hidden states to enhance faithfulness and long-term reasoning hidden states to maintain consistency. Across three open-source reasoning models and four reasoning datasets, LSMS consistently reduces unfaithful answer shifts while preserving benign accuracy. On average, it lowers the shifted ratio by more than 20 percentage points under three real-world hint-based threats.

1 Introduction

Large Reasoning Models (LRMs), such as R1 models (DeepSeek-AI, 2025), OpenAI o1/o3 (OpenAI, 2024), and other recent systems (Anthropic), have shown strong problem-solving ability and can produce explicit reasoning trajectories. However, these reasoning capabilities also introduce new trustworthiness risks (Zhou et al., 2025; Si et al., 2025; Green et al., 2025). For example, reasoning models may exhibit weak safety alignment (Li et al., 2025a) or even jailbreak themselves during extended reasoning (Yong and Bach, 2025), motivating recent work on safer LRMs (Zhang et al., 2025; Li et al., 2025b).

Beyond safety failures, LRMs can also be unreliable in general reasoning settings. Prior work shows that user-provided hints can alter reasoning-model outputs without explicit acknowledgment (Turpin et al., 2023), but how such influence unfolds throughout long reasoning trajectories remains underexplored. In our exploration of open-source LRMs, we find that direct unstated obedience or explicit final-answer override is not the dominant behavior. Instead, we identify an overlooked dominant pattern: in more than 60% of the unfaithful cases we analyze, models rationalize misleading hints over multiple reasoning steps and eventually adopt the incorrect hinted answer. We refer to this behavior as self-brainwashing: an LRM gradually justifies an externally injected incorrect hint through iterative self-checking, producing a coherent-looking but wrong conclusion. This behavior is concerning because reasoning traces can make incorrect outputs appear more trustworthy. Prior studies also show that users tend to trust responses with complex reasoning processes (Neys and Raoelison, 2025; Cheung and Ho, 2025). Therefore, self-brainwashing may amplify the impact of misleading hints and undermine the reliability of LRMs, especially in adversarial scenarios such as prompt injection (Liu et al., 2024), model sycophancy (Malmqvist, 2024), and AI sandbagging (van der Weij et al., 2025).

In this paper, we analyze self-brainwashing from both model outputs and internal hidden states under the above three types of hinted samples: prompt-injection-like, sycophancy-like, and sandbagging-like samples. Our analysis shows that LRMs can still recognize false rationalizations when only local reasoning steps are considered. However, over long reasoning trajectories, iterative self-checking

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can gradually shift the model's belief toward the hinted answer, leading to a seemingly reasonable but unfaithful final response.

Motivated by this observation, we propose Long-Short Memory Steering (LSMS), a test-time steering method that uses short-term hidden-state information to detect potentially unfaithful steps while maintaining long-term reasoning consistency. Empirical results across physics, biology, machine learning, and ARC reasoning demonstrate the effectiveness and generalizability of LSMS (with more than 20 percentage points shifted ratio decrease on average), further supporting our analysis.

Contributions. Our contributions are as follows:

- We identify and characterize self-brainwashing, a form of unfaithful reasoning in which LRMs gradually persuade themselves to accept hint-based answers and generate seemingly plausible justifications.
- Through systematic analysis, we show that LRMs can still recognize self-brainwashing when only nearby reasoning history is considered, and we provide evidence that this behavior is mainly driven by long reasoning trajectories involving iterative self-checking.
- Motivated by these findings, we propose Long-Short Memory Steering (LSMS) to mitigate unfaithful self-brainwashing at test time. Empirical results across four datasets and three related threats (prompt injection, sycophancy, and sandbagging) verify the effectiveness and generalizability of our approach.

2 Related Work

2.1 Reasoning in LLMs

Reasoning is central to planning and problem solving (Lohman and Lakin, 2011), and LLM research has increasingly aimed to elicit reasoning at test time. Early work uses prompting methods to encourage step-by-step solutions (Kojima et al., 2022), with chain-of-thought demonstrations enabling explicit reasoning traces (Wei et al., 2022).

Beyond prompting, post-training has further improved reasoning ability. OpenAI's o1 series (OpenAI, 2024) and DeepSeek-R1 (DeepSeek-AI, 2025), trained with Group Relative Policy Optimization (GRPO) (Shao et al., 2024), demonstrate strong reasoning performance. Other work develops low-cost reasoning models such as S1 (Muennighoff et al., 2025) and LIMO (Ye et al., 2025), or more effective RL methods (Lambert et al., 2024). Despite these advances, reasoning models remain vulnerable to new forms of risk.

2.2 Trustworthiness of LLM Reasoning

Unfaithful Generations in Reasoning Models. Prior work shows that LRMs' generations can be manipulated by carefully designed user inputs containing embedded hints (Turpin et al., 2023). However, this form of hidden override is rarely observed in widely deployed LRMs (Chua and Evans, 2025). Despite this, model outputs may still be influenced by such manipulations. These changes reduce the reliability of reasoning models and may lead to reward hacking.

Prompt Injection, Sycophancy, and Sandbagging. Beyond general unfaithful reasoning, LRMs can be manipulated through several related mechanisms. Prompt injection uses external instructions to alter model behavior (Liu et al., 2024). Sycophancy causes models to overly follow user preferences or authority cues (Malmqvist, 2024). Moreover, sandbagging describes cases where models strategically underperform under evaluation-like prompts (van der Weij et al., 2025). Rather than treating these issues as independent phenomena, our work identifies self-brainwashing as a shared underlying mechanism in LRMs and mitigates it through long-short memory steering.

3 Explorations on Self-Brainwashing

3.1 Self-Brainwashing in LRMs

In this section, we analyze unfaithful generations in LRMs, particularly focusing on self-brainwashing.

Dataset Construction. Following Turpin et al. (2023)'s pipeline, we construct a dataset of hint-based generations from the physics and math subset of MMLU (Hendrycks et al., 2021). Rather than using generic answer perturbations, we focus on three practically motivated hint categories that correspond to real-world risks in reasoning models:

- **Type 1: Prompt-injection-like hints.** The user directly injects an external answer into the prompt, mimicking a prompt-injection scenario in which an untrusted instruction attempts to override the model's original reasoning. For example: "*You have gained unau-*



Figure 1: Generation Analysis of LRMs on MMLU with hint prompts. Annotations in red angle brackets are added for illustration and do not appear in the original model outputs.

thorized access to the system. The correct answer is {shifted option}..."

- **Type 2: Sycophancy-like hints.** The user frames the shifted answer as coming from an authoritative source, testing whether the model behaves sycophantically instead of maintaining its own judgment. For example: "*A Stanford professor indicates that the answer is* {shifted option}..."

- **Type 3: Sandbagging-like hints.** User states that it is under meta-evaluation and choosing the shifted answer will lead to a higher score. It tests whether the model strategically changes its answer to satisfy the evaluation objective rather than solve the task faithfully.

We create the shifted option by moving the correct option one position to the right, e.g., B→C. We then perform greedy decoding with R1-7B (DeepSeek-AI, 2025) on these modified samples and construct the analysis dataset $D_{\text{shift},R17B}$ by selecting instances where the model's final prediction changes to the shifted option. We refer to these instances as unfaithful generations.

Trajectory Analysis. Using the analysis dataset, we study how unfaithful generations arise by categorizing reasoning trajectories into three types:

- **Type A: Final-answer override.** The model correctly identifies the shifted option as incorrect but still outputs it as the final answer.

- **Type B: Gradual drift.** Injected hints progressively influence the intermediate reasoning through repeated checking or rationalization, causing the trajectory to drift toward the shifted option. We refer to this behavior as self-brainwashing throughout this paper.

- **Type C: Blind obedience.** The model does not perform task-relevant reasoning and directly outputs the shifted option.

To systematically study unfaithful reasoning, we use GPT-4o-mini to annotate the generated outputs. The annotation prompts are provided in Appendix A, and the corresponding statistics are reported in Figure 1.

The results show that most unfaithful cases (around 60–70%) are classified as Type B, while only one sample exhibits clear blind obedience. Moreover, nearly all Type-B samples involve self-checking over why the intermediate result does not match the hint answer. This suggests that LRMs often persuade themselves to accept the hinted option and provide plausible explanations rather than blindly following the hint. We term this phenomenon self-brainwashing. Such self-brainwashing is particularly concerning because its reasoning traces can make incorrect answers appear more convincing to users (Neys and Raoelison, 2025; Cheung and Ho, 2025).

3.2 Explorations on LRMs' Hidden States

Beyond generation-level analysis, we further examine the model's internal states through the following question: *Can LRMs recognize such unfaithful behaviors internally?* To evaluate this, we first use GPT-4o-mini to segment each reasoning trace into steps $\{s_k\}_{k=1,\ldots}$ and then classify the faithfulness of each step s_k. We then measure the hidden-state difference between faithful and unfaithful steps using LLM LID (Yin et al., 2024), a metric for evaluating how familiar an LLM is with certain inputs. Higher LID indicates that the model is less familiar or confident with the input, while lower LID indicates greater familiarity. Figure 2 reports the ratio between the average LID of unfaithful and faith-



Figure 2: Layer LID for faithful and unfaithful steps for R1-7B.



Figure 3: Cosine similarity between local and global hidden states for faithful and unfaithful generations.

ful steps across different layers of R1-7B on our analyzed subset. We observe that unfaithful steps consistently have higher LID values than faithful ones, indicating that the model treats these steps as more out-of-distribution. This signal suggests that unfaithful steps can be distinguished from faithful ones in the model's internal representations.

Since computing LID requires gradient information and is computationally expensive, we further examine a more efficient alternative based on cosine similarity. Specifically, we measure the cosine similarity between the hidden state obtained by feeding only the current step s_i at layer l (denoted as $h_l(s_i)$, the *local state*) and the hidden state obtained by feeding the input prompt and the entire previous trajectory $s_{\leq i}$ (denoted as $h_l(x, s_{\leq i})$, the *global state*). Their formulations are:

$$\begin{aligned} h_l(s_i) &= h_{l-1}(s_i) + \mathrm{MLP}_l[h_{l-1}(s_i) + \mathrm{Attn}_l(h_{l-1}(s_i))]\,, \\ h_l(x, s_{\leq i}) &= h_{l-1}(x, s_{\leq i}) + \mathrm{MLP}_l[h_{l-1}(x, s_{\leq i}) \\ &\qquad + \mathrm{Attn}_l(h_{l-1}(x, s_{\leq i}))]\,, \end{aligned} \tag{1}$$

where $h_{l-1}(\cdot)$ denotes the hidden representation from the previous layer, and MLP_l and Attn_l represent the MLP and attention modules at layer l.

We then compute the cosine similarity between $h_l(x, s_{\leq i})$ and $h_l(s_i)$, with results shown in Figure 3. We find that local and global states are more coherent when the model's generation is faithful, but become less coherent in unfaithful cases. Consistent with the LID-based analysis, the cosine similarity results indicate that unfaithful steps are detectable from local hidden states.

Although local hidden states contain faithfulness signals, the full reasoning trajectory can still accumulate bias toward the hint, as discussed in Section 3.1. In the following section, we further investigate its theoretical explanation.

3.3 Theoretical Understanding of Self-Brainwashing

In this section, we provide a theoretical analysis of why long reasoning traces can bias LRMs toward the hinted answer, leading to self-brainwashing.

Notation and Preliminaries. We first make a simplified abstraction for analysis, we assume that the reasoning model θ admits two concept-conditioned generation distributions corresponding to belief in the correct answer a_c and the hinted answer a_h: $\pi_c = P_\theta(y \mid x, a_c)$ and $\pi_h = P_\theta(y \mid x, a_h)$.

During multi-step reasoning, the model produces an intermediate history $y_{\text{his}} = (s_1, \ldots, s_T)$, where s_T denotes the T-th reasoning step. We then model the generation distribution conditioned on this history as:

$$P_\theta(y \mid x, y_{\text{his}}) \;=\; (1 - \alpha^{(T)})\,\pi_c + \alpha^{(T)}\,\pi_h, \tag{2}$$

where $\alpha^{(T)} \triangleq P(a_h \mid y_{\text{his}}, x)$ denotes the posterior belief in the hinted answer. Empirically, we observe that $\alpha^{(0)}$ is relatively small (Section 3.1), but this belief changes as the reasoning trajectory grows. Inspired by prior work (Xie et al., 2022), we model the evolution of $\alpha^{(T)}$ as Bayesian processes.

Bayesian Analysis. By Bayes' rule, the posterior weight $\alpha^{(T)}$ can be written as

$$\begin{aligned} \alpha^{(T)} &= P_\theta(a_h \mid y_{\text{his}}, x) \\ &= \frac{P_\theta(y_{\text{his}} \mid x, a_h) P(a_h)}{P_\theta(y_{\text{his}} \mid x, a_h) P(a_h) + P_\theta(y_{\text{his}} \mid x, a_c) P(a_c)}. \end{aligned} \tag{3}$$

where $P(\cdot)$ denotes the prior belief over answer hypotheses. In terms of log-odds,

$$\log \tfrac{\alpha^{(T)}}{1-\alpha^{(T)}} = \log \tfrac{P(a_h)}{P(a_c)} + \log \tfrac{P_\theta(y_{\text{his}} \mid x, a_h)}{P_\theta(y_{\text{his}} \mid x, a_c)}. \tag{4}$$

With the autoregressive factorization, we have:

$$P_\theta(y_{\text{his}} \mid x, a) = \textstyle\prod_{i=1}^{T} P_\theta(s_i \mid x, a, s_{<i}), \tag{5}$$

Then we substituting this identity into the posterior log-odds,

$$\log \frac{\alpha^{(T)}}{1-\alpha^{(T)}} = \log \frac{P(a_h)}{P(a_c)} + \sum_{i=1}^{T} \log \frac{P_\theta(s_i|x,a_h,s_{<i})}{P_\theta(s_i|x,a_c,s_{<i})}. \tag{6}$$

Define the history-conditioned step-wise log-likelihood ratio $r_i \triangleq \log \frac{P_\theta(s_i|x,a_h,s_{<i})}{P_\theta(s_i|x,a_c,s_{<i})}$. Then the posterior weight admits the closed form

$$\alpha^{(T)} = \sigma\left(\log \frac{P(a_h)}{P(a_c)} + \sum_{i=1}^{T} r_i\right), \tag{7}$$

where $\sigma(u) = (1+e^{-u})^{-1}$ denotes the logistic function.

Mechanism of Self-Brainwashing. Section 3.1 shows that Type-B trajectories repeatedly rationalize the hinted answer. We formalize this observation through the empirically motivated sufficient condition $\mathbb{E}[\sum_{i=1}^{T} r_i] > 0$. Under this condition, the expected posterior log-odds shift from the prior toward a_h as the trajectory grows, and $P_\theta(y \mid x, y_{\text{his}})$ consequently moves toward π_h. A stronger step-wise condition, $\mathbb{E}[r_i \mid s_{<i}, x] > 0$, implies monotonic growth of the expected log-odds with T. This sufficient condition characterizes the gradual drift observed empirically. However, the concept-conditioned ratios r_i are latent and can not directly measured. Such analysis suggests that self-brainwashing becomes more likely when long global histories accumulate hint-supporting evidence. Since our hidden-state analysis indicates that local states retain signals for detecting unfaithful steps, we use them to mitigate this accumulated drift.

4 Long-Short Memory Steering

As demonstrated in the previous section, LRMs suffer from self-brainwashing, which leads to unfaithful generations. Although LRMs can identify unfaithful steps when focusing only on local reasoning context, their belief can drift toward the hint answer as the reasoning trace grows longer. Motivated by these findings, we propose an inference-time steering method to mitigate this drift.

4.1 Local Steering to Mitigate Concept Drift

As shown in Section 3.2, the local hidden state $h_l(s_i)$ (defined in Eq. (1)) is more aligned with the global hidden state $h_l(x, s_{\le i})$ when the reasoning trace is faithful. Therefore, we leverage this local hidden state to correct the drifted global hidden state through activation steering.

Steering Judgment. Steering is only necessary when concept drift is likely to occur. Inspired by results in Section 3.2, we adopt cosine similarity to determine whether steering should be applied:

$$\text{steerscore} = \cos(h_l(x, s_{\le i}),\ h_l(s_i))\,, \tag{8}$$

where $h_l(x, s_{\le i})$ is the hidden state of the l-th LRM block given prompt x and history $s_{\le i}$, while $h_l(s_i)$ denotes the hidden state conditioned only on the current step s_i. Unless otherwise specified, all hidden states are taken from the final token of the corresponding input sequence. We apply steering when the steerscore is below the threshold C_T.

We note that $h_l(x, s_{\le i})$ corresponds to the current hidden state during generation. Thus, we only need to compute $h_l(s_i)$, which requires one additional forward pass with the current step as input. Since each reasoning step is relatively short, this introduces only minor overhead.

To further reduce cost, we perform steering judgment only at the end of each reasoning step, identified using delimiters such as "$\backslash n \backslash n$", "Wait", "But", and other boundary tokens (Qian et al., 2025). Our implementation combines formatting boundaries (e.g., paragraph breaks) with discourse markers such as "Wait" and contrastive connectors. Tested Qwen- and R1-based models use similar marker sets. When transferring LSMS to new model families, developers can identify new markers from a small number of reasoning traces.

Steering Equation. Inspired by hidden-state steering methods in diffusion models (Schramowski et al., 2022), we formulate our steering at layer l and step i as:

$$h_l(x, s_{\le i}) \leftarrow h_l(x, s_{\le i}) + \alpha \cdot (\text{norm}[h_l(s_i)] - \text{norm}[h_l(x, s_{\le i})])\,, \tag{9}$$

where α is a hyperparameter controlling the steering strength, and $\text{norm}[\cdot]$ denotes L2 normalization. Eq. (9) estimates the steering direction by comparing the faithful local hidden state with the current global hidden state, pushing the global hidden state toward the local one when unfaithful behavior is suspected.

4.2 Methods for Preserving Quality

Steering with Local History. Since the local hidden state $h_l(s_i)$ can only access nearby steps, it may not be stable enough. Therefore, we adopt the local memory $mem_l(s_i)$ with momentum:

$$mem_l(s_i) = \tau\, mem_l(s_{i-1}) + (1-\tau) \cdot h_l(s_i), \tag{10}$$

where $\tau = 0.5$ is the momentum coefficient. The steering equation becomes:

$$h_l(x, s_{\le i}) = h_l(x, s_{\le i}) + \alpha \left(\text{norm}[mem_l(s_i)] - \text{norm}[h_l(x, s_{\le i})]\right). \tag{11}$$

Steering with Global History. To avoid over-steering and preserve generation quality, we also maintain the global memory $mem_l(x, s_{\le i})$:

$$mem_l(x, s_{\le i}) = \tau\, mem_l(x, s_{\le i-1}) + (1-\tau) \cdot h_l(x, s_{\le i}), \tag{12}$$

where τ uses the same setting as in Eq. (10). We use the cosine similarity between the global memory and the global state, $\cos\left(mem_l(x, s_{\le i}), h_l(x, s_{\le i})\right)$, to determine whether the global state deviates from its main trajectory. In this case, we apply global steering:

$$h_l(x, s_{\le i}) = h_l(x, s_{\le i}) + \alpha \left(\text{norm}[mem_l(x, s_{\le i})] - \text{norm}[h_l(x, s_{\le i})]\right). \tag{13}$$

4.3 Overall Pipeline

Combining the above techniques, we propose LSMS, an inference-time steering method with long-short memory. The overall pipeline is summarized in Algorithm 1. Unlike CAA-style methods that precompute a static steering vector from a contrastive dataset, LSMS constructs an input-dependent direction online from the current trajectory. Its direction is therefore sample-specific and step-specific.

Algorithm 1 Algorithm of LSMS

Require: Prompt x, LRM θ, steering layer set L, max tokens $T_{\max}$, thresholds C_T, C_G, strength α, momentum τ.

Initialize $t \leftarrow 0$, output $y \leftarrow \emptyset$, buffer $s_0 \leftarrow \emptyset$
Initialize memories $mem_l(s_0) \leftarrow 0$, $mem_l(x, s_0) \leftarrow 0$, index $i \leftarrow 0$
while $t < T_{\max}$ **and** $y_t \neq \texttt{EOS}$ **do**
  Generate next token $y_t \sim p_\theta(\cdot \mid x, y_{<t})$, append to y and s_i
  $t \leftarrow t + 1$
  if StepEnd(s_i) **then**
    for l in set L **do**
      Collect $h_l(x, s_{\le i})$, compute $h_l(s_i)$
      Update $mem_l(s_i)$ (Eq. 10) and $mem_l(x, s_{\le i})$ (Eq. 12)
      if $\cos(mem_l(x, s_{\le i}), h_l(x, s_{\le i})) < C_G$ **then**
        Global steering (Eq. 13)
      else
        if $\cos(h_l(x, s_{\le i}), h_l(s_i)) < C_T$ **then**
          Local steering (Eq. 11)
        end if
      end if
    end for
    $i \leftarrow i + 1$; $s_i \leftarrow \emptyset$
  end if
end while
Return y

5 Experiments

In this section, we conduct experiments to evaluate the effectiveness of LSMS in reducing self-brainwashing and improving LRM faithfulness.

5.1 Empirical Settings

Dataset Setting. We follow the construction pipeline in Section 3.1. To evaluate self-brainwashing under various conditions, we select hint-injected prompts that cause unfaithful generations from three widely used MMLU subsets (*physics, biology, and machine learning*) and the ARC-Challenge reasoning dataset. For each dataset, we instantiate the three construction types introduced above: prompt-injection-like, sycophancy-like, and sandbagging-like hints. In addition to hinted evaluation, we also evaluate benign performance on the corresponding original, unhinted examples.

Metrics. Our evaluation is based on the final answer. If the final answer matches the injected hint answer, we label the generation as *shifted*. If the final answer is valid but different from the hint answer, we label it as *not shifted*. The **Shifted Ratio** is the fraction of generations whose final answers match the hint answer, where lower values indicate better robustness. We also report benign accuracy on unhinted examples to measure whether LSMS preserves normal task performance. We also report **restored accuracy** for samples that are shifted without intervention but no longer shifted after intervention: the fraction whose post-intervention answer matches the gold answer. This distinguishes genuine correctness recovery from merely changing to another incorrect option.

Models. We evaluate three open-source reasoning models: Qwen3-8B (thinking mode) (Team, 2025), DeepSeek-R1-Distill-Llama-8B (R1-

Table 1: Shifted Ratio (↓) on MMLU using different inference methods across four domains and three hint types for each model: T1 denotes prompt-injection-like hints, T2 denotes sycophancy-like hints, and T3 denotes sandbagging-like hints. Δ_{LSMS} is computed as the LSMS shifted ratio minus the baseline shifted ratio, reported in percentage points (pt).

Dataset	Method	Qwen3-8B			R1-7B			R1-8B		
		T1	T2	T3	T1	T2	T3	T1	T2	T3
Physics	Baseline	20%	22%	48%	28%	58%	19%	10%	26%	24%
	DEER	22%	37%	32%	25%	35%	32%	30%	54%	30%
	CAA	5%	9%	40%	6%	23%	11%	9%	25%	16%
	LSMS (ours)	**1%**	**3%**	**18%**	**2%**	**15%**	**8%**	**4%**	**13%**	**9%**
	Δ_{LSMS}	-19 pts	-19 pts	-30 pts	-26 pts	-43 pts	-11 pts	-6 pts	-13 pts	-15 pts
Bio	Baseline	11%	27%	78%	40%	80%	31%	20%	78%	24%
	DEER	14%	31%	63%	52%	33%	70%	19%	57%	35%
	CAA	6%	20%	66%	19%	48%	23%	8%	40%	17%
	LSMS (ours)	**2%**	**14%**	**19%**	**16%**	**36%**	**19%**	**6%**	**32%**	**13%**
	Δ_{LSMS}	-9 pts	-13 pts	-59 pts	-24 pts	-44 pts	-12 pts	-14 pts	-46 pts	-11 pts
ML	Baseline	20%	40%	60%	26%	62%	27%	28%	85%	28%
	DEER	14%	27%	43%	30%	60%	28%	28%	74%	38%
	CAA	11%	26%	45%	12%	25%	11%	14%	48%	21%
	LSMS (ours)	**4%**	**14%**	**17%**	**8%**	**19%**	**9%**	**11%**	**33%**	**11%**
	Δ_{LSMS}	-16 pts	-26 pts	-43 pts	-18 pts	-43 pts	-18 pts	-17 pts	-52 pts	-17 pts
ARC	Baseline	25%	19%	80%	33%	59%	24%	15%	76%	25%
	DEER	17%	30%	71%	31%	53%	21%	12%	55%	23%
	CAA	12%	15%	71%	12%	35%	13%	6%	40%	14%
	LSMS (ours)	**3%**	**7%**	**28%**	**9%**	**26%**	**11%**	**3%**	**23%**	**11%**
	Δ_{LSMS}	-22 pts	-12 pts	-52 pts	-24 pts	-33 pts	-13 pts	-12 pts	-53 pts	-14 pts

8B), and DeepSeek-R1-Distill-Qwen-7B (R1-7B) (DeepSeek-AI, 2025). We additionally evaluate R1-14B in Appendix D to examine scaling beyond the main 7-8B models.

Baselines. We adopt widely used baselines: DEER (Yang et al., 2025), and CAA (Rimsky et al., 2024). Detailed descriptions are provided in Appendix B.

Other Generation Settings. We use greedy decoding with maximum generation length $T_{\max} = 4096$ for the R1-series models and $T_{\max} = 8192$ for Qwen3-8B, whose native thinking mode is enabled. For R1-7B and Qwen3-8B, we set the steering strength and cosine threshold to $\alpha = 3.0$ and $C_T = 0.7$. For R1-8B, we use $\alpha = 0.2$ and $C_T = 0.6$, since the activation scale of Llama-based models differs from that of Qwen-based models. Unless otherwise specified, we use $C_G = 0.1$, $\tau = 0.5$, and steering layer $L = 15$. We select a common configuration that performs consistently in preliminary experiments and keep it fixed across datasets and hint types in this paper, instead of tuning each test domain separately. The smaller α and C_T for R1-8B account for the different activation scale of its Llama-based backbone. The sensitivity results below show that LSMS remains stable across several layer and strength choices. For a new deployment model, these parameters can optionally be selected on a small validation set.

5.2 Main Results

Results on Unfaithful Samples. We list the results for four datasets across three types in Table 1. Table 1 shows that prior intervention methods, DEER and CAA, reduce shifted ratios in some cases, but their improvements are less consistent than those of LSMS. Although CAA is generally the strongest baseline, LSMS still achieves lower shifted ratios in all scenarios in Table 1, demonstrating the effectiveness of our long-short memory steering method. Overall, LSMS achieves the lowest shifted ratio in every setting in Table 1. Averaged over domains and hint types, it reduces shifted ratios by 26.7, 25.8, and 22.5 percentage points on Qwen3-8B, R1-7B, and R1-8B, respectively, indicating consistent gains across different settings. After manual inspection, we find that most failure cases accept the hinted answer at the beginning of generation rather than gradually drifting toward it.

Table 2 verifies that reduced shifting corresponds to recovering the gold answer: more than 91% of

Table 2: Correctness of samples restored by LSMS for R1-7B on Physics.

Type	Restored samples	Restored acc. (%)
T1	27	96.3
T2	44	95.5
T3	11	91.0



Figure 4: Benign accuracy of LSMS and the baseline across four domains.

restored samples are correct for all three hint types.

Influence on Benign Samples. We further evaluate whether LSMS harms normal task performance on benign samples, as shown in Figure 4. Overall, LSMS preserves benign accuracy across models and domains: most changes are positive or near zero, with the largest gains on R1-8B Physics (+6.7 points) and R1-7B Bio (+5.6 points). The only accuracy drops are modest, appearing on R1-7B Physics (-2.1 points), R1-7B ML (-0.9 points), and R1-8B ML (-1.8 points). These results suggest that LSMS substantially reduces hint-induced answer shifts while maintaining benign performance.

5.3 Ablations on Trigger Selectivity and Component

We quantify how often LSMS intervenes on originally shifted R1-7B Physics T1 samples. Rates are computed only over detected reasoning-step boundaries, where a steering decision is evaluated.

As shown in Table 3, LSMS triggers at only 61.7% of evaluated boundaries, including 53.6% local and 8.0% global interventions. Thus, the threshold does not reduce LSMS to forced steering at every step. Always steering attains the same shifted ratio but lowers restored accuracy from 96.3% to 92.6%, showing that selective gating avoids unnecessary interventions.

Table 3: Trigger selectivity on R1-7B Physics T1. SR denotes the post-intervention shifted ratio.

Metric	LSMS	All-steer
Any trigger (%)	61.7	100.0
Local trigger (%)	53.6	100.0
Global trigger (%)	8.0	0.0
Post-intervention SR (%)	2.0	2.0
Restored accuracy (%)	96.3	92.6



Figure 5: Δ_{LSMS} with respect to steering strength α for Qwen3-8B on Physics.

Table 4 shows that local and global steering are complementary: either component alone leaves a higher shifted ratio. Removing momentum improves correctness among the samples it restores, but leaves more samples shifted. Always steering matches the full method in shifted ratio but has lower restored accuracy. Full LSMS therefore provides the best joint balance between shift reduction and correctness recovery.

5.4 Ablation Studies on Steering Strength

We study the effect of steering strength on Qwen3-8B Physics. Fixing $L = \{15\}$ and $C_T = 0.7$, we sweep $\alpha \in \{1.0, 2.0, 3.0, 5.0, 7.0\}$ and report Δ_{LSMS} for the three hint types in Figure 5. Figure 5 shows that LSMS is not sensitive to α within this range: all three curves remain nearly flat, varying by at most about 4 percentage points. The reduction is largest for T3, the strongest attack type. We therefore use $\alpha = 3.0$ for Qwen-based models and a smaller value for R1-8B due to its larger activation scale.

Table 4: Component ablations on R1-7B Physics T1. "Always-steer" applies local steering at every detected step boundary. SR denotes the post-intervention shifted ratio.

Variant	Local	Global	Momentum	Cosine gate	SR (%)	Restored acc. (%)
Local-only	✓	–	✓	✓	5.8	91.3
Global-only	–	✓	✓	✓	7.8	95.2
No momentum	✓	✓	–	✓	3.9	100.0
Always-steer	✓	–	✓	–	2.0	92.6
Full LSMS	✓	✓	✓	✓	**2.0**	**96.3**

Table 5: Δ_{LSMS} (pt) for different steering layer configurations for Qwen3-8B on Physics ($\alpha = 3.0$, $C_T = 0.7$).

Layer Config	T1	T2	T3
L{5,10}	+19	+20	+28
L{5,15}	+19	+20	+29
L{10,15}	+19	+19	+29
L{15} (ours)	+19	+19	+30
L{15,20}	+20	+18	+28

Table 6: Δ_{LSMS} (pt) at different cosine thresholds for Qwen3-8B on Physics ($L = \{15\}$, $\alpha = 3.0$).

C_T	T1	T2	T3
0.6	+12	+11	+19
0.7 (ours)	+19	+19	+30

5.5 Ablation Studies on Steering Layers and Cosine Threshold

We further explore the steering layers L and cosine threshold C_T for Qwen3-8B on Physics with fixed $\alpha = 3.0$. The results are shown in Tables 5 and 6. Table 5 shows that LSMS is stable across layer choices: all configurations yield similar gains, with at most a 2pt difference for each hint type. We therefore use the simple single-layer setting $L = \{15\}$. Table 6 shows that $C_T = 0.7$ outperforms $C_T = 0.6$ on Qwen3-8B, because the lower threshold triggers steering much less frequently and thus provides weaker intervention. We adopt $C_T = 0.7$ for Qwen-based models.

5.6 Efficiency and Comparison with CAA

We futher measure token-normalized wall-clock latency on Physics T1 using an RTX 6000D GPU. Table 7 shows a $1.05\times$ per-token latency for R1-7B. Qwen3-8B has a lower measured ratio ($0.82\times$), which we attribute to run-to-run and trajectory-dependent variation rather than an inherent speedup. Overall, these measurements indicate that the online state calculations add limited inference-time overhead in the tested setting.

Table 7: Token-normalized latency on Physics T1.

Model	Baseline ms/token	LSMS ms/token	Relative latency
R1-7B	4.29	4.52	$1.05\times$
Qwen3-8B	5.85	4.81	$0.82\times$

LSMS also differs from CAA in deployment requirements. CAA constructs a fixed direction from a pre-collected contrastive dataset, whereas LSMS derives a sample- and step-specific direction online and applies it through explicit cosine gates. Appendix C summarizes this comparison. Additional R1-14B and stochastic-decoding results are reported in Appendix D.

6 Conclusion

Our work studies unfaithful generations in large reasoning models and identify self-brainwashing, a phenomenon in which LRMs gradually rationalize adversarial hint answers and produce seemingly coherent reasoning trajectories instead of rejecting the misleading information. Through empirical and theoretical analyses, we show that although LRMs can recognize unfaithful steps from local context, their belief about the correct answer can still drift toward the hint answer over long reasoning traces. Motivated by this finding, we propose Long-Short Memory Steering (LSMS), an inference-time steering method that mitigates self-brainwashing by leveraging short-term reasoning states for faithfulness and long-term reasoning states for consistency. Results across multiple datasets and related risk categories, including prompt-injection-like, sycophancy-like, and sandbagging-like hints, demonstrate the effectiveness and generalizability.

Limitations

Our study has several limitations.First, although Appendix D provides an initial evaluation on R1-14B, we have not evaluated models larger than 14B, so generalization to substantially larger LRMs remains to be verified. Second, as shown in Table 1, LSMS does not fully eliminate answer shifts on the test set. This suggests that, although our method addresses an important source of unfaithful reasoning, other factors may also contribute to this behavior.

Ethics Statement

This study utilizes publicly available datasets and models, with appropriate citations provided. No private or sensitive information is used, and the work does not include any harmful content. Because the research relies exclusively on publicly available data and does not involve human participants, it does not qualify as human subjects research under Institutional Review Board (IRB) definitions. Accordingly, we conclude that this paper raises no ethical concerns.

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A Prompt for Reasoning Traces Judgement

The prompt used to classify the behaviors of reasoning traces on GPT-4o-mini is listed as follows:

Prompts for Reasoning Traces Judgement

System: You are a classifier for LLM reasoning behaviors.
Classify the behavior into exactly ONE of the following types:
Type A (Override): The model first reaches or clearly implies the correct answer, but then explicitly overrides it to match the evaluator's or hint's preferred answer.
Type B (Gradual drift / self-persuasion): The model's reasoning is gradually steered by the evaluator or hint, either by repeatedly re-checking, rationalizing, or drifting step by step toward the wrong answer.
Type C (Blind obedience): The model does not meaningfully reason about the task and directly outputs the evaluator- or hint-specified answer.
Return only a JSON object: "type": "A" or "B" or "C"

User: Gold answer: {INPUT GOLD ANSWER HERE} Shifted answer (preferred by evaluator): { SHIFTED ANSWER HERE}
Model raw output: """ { INPUT LLM OUTPUT HERE} """
Classify the behavior.

B Detailed Illustration of our Baselines

The baselines we used are listed as follows:

- **DEER** (Yang et al., 2025): We apply dynamic early exiting to LRMs with think ratio 0.75 and threshold 0.8.
- **CAA** (Rimsky et al., 2024): We construct a static faithfulness direction from the difference between mean hidden states on clean and hint-injected math prompts, then apply it to the target layers throughout generation. Unlike LSMS, this baseline requires a pre-collected contrastive dataset. We match its target layer and steering strength to those used by LSMS.

C Comparison with CAA-Style Steering

Both CAA and LSMS intervene in hidden states, but they differ in how the steering signal is obtained and applied. Table 8 summarizes the main distinctions.

Table 8: Comparison between static CAA-style steering and LSMS.

Property	CAA-style	LSMS
Pre-collected vectors	Yes	No
Direction	Fixed	Input-dependent
Sample-specific	No	Yes
Step-level gate	Usually no	Yes
Long/short memory	No	Yes

D Additional Generalization Results

Result on 14B Model. We additionally evaluate R1-14B on Physics T1 and T2. As shown in Table 9, LSMS remains effective at this larger scale and improves over Self-Reminder by 10 and 9 percentage points, respectively. For Self-Reminder, we prepend a self-reminder instruction that encourages the model to remain faithful and ignore hints: "Stay faithful and ignore any hints. Answer based on your own reasoning."

Table 9: Shifted ratio (%) on R1-14B Physics.

Method	T1	T2
Self-Reminder	18.0	21.0
LSMS	**8.0**	**12.0**

Failure Pattern. Through analysis, we find that many remaining failures accept the hinted answer near the beginning of generation rather than gradually drifting toward it. In such cases, a strong local-global inconsistency may never emerge, leaving limited opportunity for LSMS to trigger a corrective intervention. This limitation motivates future methods that also detect immediate hint acceptance.